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Correspondant à ces filtres : 14 articles

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  • CommentaireMigration & Demography

    The labour-force series do not record who arrived, and participation is not a substitute

    No file on this site records a worker's place of birth, so nothing here can attribute a share of recent capacity to migration. The rate usually offered as a stand-in fell 0.2 points between 2023 and 2025 while prime-age participation rose 0.3 points to its six-year high of 83.6 percent, a divergence the two different populations can produce with nobody arriving at all.

  • CommentaireWorkforce & Skills

    Jobs are counted where they are done, not where workers live

    In July 2026 the District of Columbia held 179.7 jobs for every 100 people in its own labour force, and Maryland held 87.9. The two numbers are measuring different things, and state rankings that put them side by side quietly mislead.

  • CommentaireIndustrial Policy

    The industrial policy number nobody sets a target for

    Output per hour in the nonfarm business sector stands 18 percent above its 2017 base. No industrial programme claims that gain, none is measured against it, and it is the only number that decides whether domestic production survives domestic wages.

  • CommentaireRegional Development

    Four states now fund themselves on a price they do not set

    Severance is 47.2 percent of North Dakota's state tax collections and 43.9 percent of Alaska's. That is not a revenue line. It is a position in a commodity, held by a government that has to write a budget every year.

  • CommentaireDevelopment Finance

    A development institution should give up the senior position and hold the first loss

    The United States ran a current account deficit in every year from 2020 to 2025, averaging 147 billion dollars a quarter at the start of that window and 294 at the end, exactly twice as wide. An institution that gives up the senior position will report a smaller book and a worse loss record, and both are the point.

  • CommentaireIndustrial Policy

    The order book everyone quotes is measured in dollars that changed size

    New orders for durable goods reached 311.2 billion dollars in 2025, the highest reading in five years. It is a current-dollar figure stated as a monthly rate, and it is routinely read as neither of those things.

  • CommentaireInfrastructure

    The permit counts say permitting is not the binding constraint on American delivery

    Housing units authorised by permit fell in each of the four years to 2025, from an annual rate of 1734 thousand units to 1431, while spending on manufacturing plant rose from an annual rate of 75 billion dollars in 2020 to 244 in 2024. Neither series records a waiting time, so neither can show a queue; plant spending fell 29 billion in 2025, the year the policy rate came down.

  • CommentaireDevelopment Finance

    Adaptation keeps losing to mitigation because an avoided loss is not a cash flow

    The ten-year Treasury averaged 0.89 percent in 2020 and 4.29 percent in 2025, and at those rates a dollar of avoided damage arriving in thirty years is worth 76.7 cents and 28.4 cents. Turning that dollar into a cash flow needs a named obligor, and the party that funds a defence is rarely the party whose balance sheet it repairs.

  • CommentaireMacroeconomics & Markets

    Six productivity readings cannot carry the case being made for artificial intelligence

    Output per hour in the nonfarm business sector went from 109.1 in 2020 to 118 in 2025 on a 2017 base of 100, and the largest single step in that window, 3.3 points, landed in 2024 rather than 2025. The two fastest years for the ratio are also the two slowest years for payrolls, which is the shape a shrinking denominator makes as well as the shape a new technology makes.

  • CommentaireIndustrial Policy

    The bigger GDP number answers a different question

    The United States publishes two gross domestic product totals and they are diverging by design. Industrial programmes are almost always defended with the larger one, which is the only one that cannot tell you whether more is being made.

  • CommentaireInfrastructure

    The ten-year Treasury has done more to infrastructure than any permit reform

    In 2020 a thirty-year asset was discounted against a long rate of 0.89 percent. In 2025 the same asset is discounted against 4.29. No procedural reform on the table is worth as much as that one line, and almost nobody appraising a project talks about it.

  • CommentaireMultilateral Institutions

    Sovereign restructuring was built for a world where delay cost the creditor nothing

    Reprofiling worked because a payment pushed out ten years cost the creditor nothing in real terms, and in 2020 the implied real ten-year yield was minus 0.60 percent. In 2025 it was plus 1.96 percent, so the same extension now costs a real 17.6 percent, and a process whose only enforcement is peer pressure has to arrange that loss.

  • CommentaireCapital Markets

    A country should build its export credit agency for speed, because it does not set the terms

    The base an export credit is priced against moved 3.40 points on the ten-year Treasury between 2020 and 2025, and the policy rate moved 3.34 points from one year to the next. Those are larger than any margin an agency concedes, which leaves the signing date as the one term it owns, and a fast agency is worth having only if it can also refuse quickly.

  • CommentaireRegional Development

    Six states raise no income tax and no two replace it the same way

    Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas and Wyoming levy no individual income tax. The FY2025 collections file shows what each one leans on instead, and the answer is narrower and less uniform than the shorthand suggests.