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Correspondant à ces filtres : 16 articles
Articles
- CommentaireWorkforce & Skills
A national credential is built for a job market no state actually has
The Bureau's 2025 occupational file lists twelve local specialities for each of 51 jurisdictions, 612 rows holding 351 different occupations, and 204 of those appear on exactly one state's list. The same file records no credential at all, so an employer certificate would have to publish numbers a stranger can count before it could replace the system it criticises.
- CommentaireMigration & Demography
The labour-force series do not record who arrived, and participation is not a substitute
No file on this site records a worker's place of birth, so nothing here can attribute a share of recent capacity to migration. The rate usually offered as a stand-in fell 0.2 points between 2023 and 2025 while prime-age participation rose 0.3 points to its six-year high of 83.6 percent, a divergence the two different populations can produce with nobody arriving at all.
- CommentaireWorkforce & Skills
Administrative capacity should be counted in decisions per qualified head, not in the occupational group that carries its name
Office and Administrative Support is the largest occupational group in the country, 17,753,410 jobs of a 51-state total of 155,495,750. The District of Columbia, where administration is the industry, ranks last of the 51 on it, at 76.871 such jobs per thousand against Tennessee's 129.94.
- CommentaireIndustrial Policy
The industrial policy number nobody sets a target for
Output per hour in the nonfarm business sector stands 18 percent above its 2017 base. No industrial programme claims that gain, none is measured against it, and it is the only number that decides whether domestic production survives domestic wages.
- CommentaireIndustrial Policy
Semiconductor subsidy should be judged on demand met at home, not on fabs opened
Construction spending on manufacturing plant fell from an annual rate of 244 billion dollars in 2024 to 215 billion in 2025, while U.S. semiconductor production rose from 144 to 165 on a 2017 base, its largest step in five observations. The two yardsticks now available disagree about the same year, and the one that should settle the question appears in none of this data.
- CommentaireIndustrial Policy
The order book everyone quotes is measured in dollars that changed size
New orders for durable goods reached 311.2 billion dollars in 2025, the highest reading in five years. It is a current-dollar figure stated as a monthly rate, and it is routinely read as neither of those things.
- CommentaireMacroeconomics & Markets
Six productivity readings cannot carry the case being made for artificial intelligence
Output per hour in the nonfarm business sector went from 109.1 in 2020 to 118 in 2025 on a 2017 base of 100, and the largest single step in that window, 3.3 points, landed in 2024 rather than 2025. The two fastest years for the ratio are also the two slowest years for payrolls, which is the shape a shrinking denominator makes as well as the shape a new technology makes.
- CommentaireIndustrial Policy
The bigger GDP number answers a different question
The United States publishes two gross domestic product totals and they are diverging by design. Industrial programmes are almost always defended with the larger one, which is the only one that cannot tell you whether more is being made.
- CommentaireStrategic Technology
An export control can close a sale and it cannot close a dependency
Goods imports from China averaged 45 billion dollars a month in 2022 and 26 billion a month in 2025, and goods exports to mainland China fell to 9 billion a month, the lowest of six readings. Over the same years the balance in goods and services widened from minus 75 billion a month to minus 78, the widest of its own six.
- CommentaireIndustrial Policy
One industrial line is climbing and the index around it is not
Domestic semiconductor production reached 165 on a 2017 base in 2025, from 121 in 2021. Total industrial production reached 101.2. That gap is the best evidence economic-security policy has in this data, which is exactly why it should be claimed carefully.
- CommentaireTrade & Investment
Trade policy built for containers is missing a trillion dollars of exports
Services exports run at $1.2 trillion on the Bureau of Economic Analysis measure. Tariff schedules, rules of origin and customs lines cannot see them, which means neither the protection nor the retaliation lands where a growing part of the exposure sits.
- CommentaireEconomic Security
Before the next plant, explain the idle line
American manufacturing used 75.3 percent of its capacity in 2025, against 77.6 percent in 2022. A programme that pays to add capacity without accounting for the capacity already standing is not an industrial policy. It is a construction policy.
- CommentaireEconomic Security
The import bill is an input cost, not a scoreboard
The United States imported $4.25 trillion of goods and services in 2025. Reading that total as a loss column is what makes a broad tariff look like a collection from abroad rather than a tax on American production.
- CommentaireIndustrial Policy
Industrial policy is being judged by the wrong labour number
The unemployment rate says how many job-seekers found work. It says nothing about how many people are looking. For a programme meant to draw people back into work, that is the only question that matters.
- CommentaireInfrastructure
Three flat years of housing starts is a result, not a pause
Starts have run at 1.42, 1.37 and 1.36 million units since 2023, below where the window opened in 2020. The dollars going into construction rose through the same period, and the dollars are what gets quoted.
- CommentaireEconomic Security
An economy that exports eleven percent of its output is hard to coerce
The Bureau of Economic Analysis puts exports at 11 percent of GDP. That number disappoints anyone who wants trade to be the growth engine and reassures anyone who thinks a trade fight is cheap. Both readings make the same mistake about what an average is.