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Под эти фильтры подходит: 40 материалов
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- ВзглядIndustrial Policy
Productive capacity names a quantity that no series on this site reports
Of the fifty-eight annual series in the file behind this site, one carries the word capacity in its title, and it reports a percentage of capacity rather than an amount of it. What stands in are four measures of four different things, and they moved in different directions over the same three years.
- КомментарийIndustrial Policy
Announced investment is not a statistic and industrial policy should stop being scored on it
Construction spending on manufacturing plant rose from an annual rate of 82 billion dollars in 2021 to 215 billion in 2025, while the manufacturing output index moved from 97.6 to 97.3 on a 2017 base of 100. Lag complicates the comparison: a plant paid for in 2024 reaches an output index years later, which argues for waiting rather than scoring the policy on its announcements.
- ВзглядIndustrial Policy
Public capital is allocated by the form of the claim, and the only contest the statistics show is inside one construction total
Spending on manufacturing plant went from 75 billion dollars in 2020 to 244 in 2024 and 215 in 2025, while housing units authorised by permit ended the window 48 thousand below where they began. Neither total separates public money from private, and nothing in the record decomposes the federal balance into the claims that competed for it.
- ВзглядIndustrial Policy
Public purchasing is an industrial instrument, and none of these series counts it as one
A government's order book transfers demand risk in a way a grant cannot, which is the reason it would work as industrial policy. What complicates the case is that the spending which is counted rose steeply, plant construction going from 75 billion dollars in 2020 to 244 in 2024, and manufacturing output is still below its 2017 base.
- ВзглядIndustrial Policy
Regulation can change what an asset does; only ownership decides that it exists
Ownership gives a state two rights no rule confers: the decision that an asset exists, and the claim on whatever is left over once it does. What complicates the case is price, because the ten-year Treasury rate averaged 0.89 percent in 2020 and 4.29 percent in 2025, and a state that owns must raise the money before it decides anything.
- ВзглядIndustrial Policy
Institutional quality is several separable capacities, and the score that ranks them is mostly a choice of weights
Operationally the term names separable things: a task specified, a cost stated, a time stated, and a published record of whether the work was done. A composite removes the units before it adds them, and on this site's own state index the weightings a person could defend move one jurisdiction across thirty places.
- ВзглядIndustrial Policy
Industrial strategy is a decade-long commitment made by institutions that are not built to hold one
Spending on manufacturing plant rose from a yearly rate of 75 billion dollars in 2020 to 244 in 2024, lifting the factory share of all nonresidential building from 8.8 percent to 18.8. Manufacturing employment reached its high for these six years in 2023 and is lower now, which is what it looks like when a country can order buildings faster than the institutions to run them.
- ВзглядIndustrial Policy
Ten of fifty-one jurisdictions are concentrated in both production and engineering work, and the record cannot show a cluster forming in any of them
Twenty-five jurisdictions employ production workers more intensively than the nation and twenty-three do the same for architecture and engineering, but only ten do both. The rate at which people quit a job, which is the closest thing the record holds to the movement a cluster runs on, gave its lowest reading of the window in 2025.
- РазъяснениеRegional Development
What a new business application actually counts
Business applications are the fastest local signal of new enterprise, and the most often oversold. By the end you will know what the filing is, how far it sits from a business with employees, and what the count cannot tell a city.
- ВзглядIndustrial Policy
Each instrument of economic statecraft has its own published series and the doctrine meant to rank them has none
Construction spending on manufacturing plant ran at 75 billion dollars a year in 2020 and 215 in 2025, while manufacturing output on a 2017 base of 100 ended the window at 97.3. Every instrument of statecraft has a published series, and the ranking that says which instrument yields when two collide has none.
- КомментарийIndustrial Policy
A state incentive buys a location decision, not national capacity
Plant construction spending rose from an annual rate of 75 billion dollars in 2020 to 244 billion in 2024; manufacturing output ended 2025 4.3 index points above 2020, and employment three hundred thousand below its 2023 peak. Plant takes years to run, so those readings are not yet a verdict.
- ВзглядIndustrial Policy
In fifty of fifty-one jurisdictions the largest occupational group pays below the median
The biggest block of jobs in almost every American state is a below-median one, and in 47 of 51 it is the same group. Industrial work sits in the middle of that ladder, which is a better case for it than its advocates usually make and a smaller one than they claim.
- КомментарийIndustrial Policy
A facility count is not a pollution count
Our environment dataset holds one number per state, the count of facilities reporting to the EPA Toxics Release Inventory. It is a measure of industrial density, the file says so plainly, and I am not going to chart it.
- КомментарийIndustrial Policy
The industrial policy number nobody sets a target for
Output per hour in the nonfarm business sector stands 18 percent above its 2017 base. No industrial programme claims that gain, none is measured against it, and it is the only number that decides whether domestic production survives domestic wages.
- ВыводIndustrial Policy
New orders for durable goods fell once in five years, then jumped
Orders dipped by 4.9 billion dollars a month in 2024 and rose by 23.4 billion in 2025, the largest single-year gain in the window. The series counts dollars, not machines.
- КомментарийIndustrial Policy
Semiconductor subsidy should be judged on demand met at home, not on fabs opened
Construction spending on manufacturing plant fell from an annual rate of 244 billion dollars in 2024 to 215 billion in 2025, while U.S. semiconductor production rose from 144 to 165 on a 2017 base, its largest step in five observations. The two yardsticks now available disagree about the same year, and the one that should settle the question appears in none of this data.
- ВыводIndustrial Policy
Core capital-goods orders took three years to return to their 2022 figure
The monthly average rose from 62 billion dollars in 2020 to 77 in 2022, then ran 75, 74 and back to 77. The figure counts dollars and is not adjusted for prices, so a return to the same number is not a return to the same order book.
- КомментарийIndustrial Policy
The order book everyone quotes is measured in dollars that changed size
New orders for durable goods reached 311.2 billion dollars in 2025, the highest reading in five years. It is a current-dollar figure stated as a monthly rate, and it is routinely read as neither of those things.
- ВыводIndustrial Policy
Research spending has no down year, and its largest annual addition was in 2022
The quarterly average rose from 754 billion dollars in 2020 to 1,081 billion in 2025, 327 billion higher across five steps. The largest of those steps, 103 billion, came in 2022, and the three years since have added 139 billion between them.
- ВыводMacroeconomics & Markets
Four fifths of the rise in new business applications since 2020 came in a single year
The weekly average went from 84 thousand applications in 2020 to 104 thousand in 2021, and the four years since have added five. The 2025 reading of 109 thousand is the highest of the six, and also the third rise in a series that has fallen in the year between each one.