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符合这些筛选条件:11 篇稿件
稿件
- 视角Industrial Policy
Productive capacity names a quantity that no series on this site reports
Of the fifty-eight annual series in the file behind this site, one carries the word capacity in its title, and it reports a percentage of capacity rather than an amount of it. What stands in are four measures of four different things, and they moved in different directions over the same three years.
- 视角Industrial Policy
Public capital is allocated by the form of the claim, and the only contest the statistics show is inside one construction total
Spending on manufacturing plant went from 75 billion dollars in 2020 to 244 in 2024 and 215 in 2025, while housing units authorised by permit ended the window 48 thousand below where they began. Neither total separates public money from private, and nothing in the record decomposes the federal balance into the claims that competed for it.
- 视角Industrial Policy
Public purchasing is an industrial instrument, and none of these series counts it as one
A government's order book transfers demand risk in a way a grant cannot, which is the reason it would work as industrial policy. What complicates the case is that the spending which is counted rose steeply, plant construction going from 75 billion dollars in 2020 to 244 in 2024, and manufacturing output is still below its 2017 base.
- 视角Industrial Policy
Regulation can change what an asset does; only ownership decides that it exists
Ownership gives a state two rights no rule confers: the decision that an asset exists, and the claim on whatever is left over once it does. What complicates the case is price, because the ten-year Treasury rate averaged 0.89 percent in 2020 and 4.29 percent in 2025, and a state that owns must raise the money before it decides anything.
- 视角Industrial Policy
Institutional quality is several separable capacities, and the score that ranks them is mostly a choice of weights
Operationally the term names separable things: a task specified, a cost stated, a time stated, and a published record of whether the work was done. A composite removes the units before it adds them, and on this site's own state index the weightings a person could defend move one jurisdiction across thirty places.
- 视角Industrial Policy
Industrial strategy is a decade-long commitment made by institutions that are not built to hold one
Spending on manufacturing plant rose from a yearly rate of 75 billion dollars in 2020 to 244 in 2024, lifting the factory share of all nonresidential building from 8.8 percent to 18.8. Manufacturing employment reached its high for these six years in 2023 and is lower now, which is what it looks like when a country can order buildings faster than the institutions to run them.
- 视角Industrial Policy
Ten of fifty-one jurisdictions are concentrated in both production and engineering work, and the record cannot show a cluster forming in any of them
Twenty-five jurisdictions employ production workers more intensively than the nation and twenty-three do the same for architecture and engineering, but only ten do both. The rate at which people quit a job, which is the closest thing the record holds to the movement a cluster runs on, gave its lowest reading of the window in 2025.
- 视角Industrial Policy
Each instrument of economic statecraft has its own published series and the doctrine meant to rank them has none
Construction spending on manufacturing plant ran at 75 billion dollars a year in 2020 and 215 in 2025, while manufacturing output on a 2017 base of 100 ended the window at 97.3. Every instrument of statecraft has a published series, and the ranking that says which instrument yields when two collide has none.
- 视角Industrial Policy
In fifty of fifty-one jurisdictions the largest occupational group pays below the median
The biggest block of jobs in almost every American state is a below-median one, and in 47 of 51 it is the same group. Industrial work sits in the middle of that ladder, which is a better case for it than its advocates usually make and a smaller one than they claim.
- 视角Industrial Policy
What an allocator actually learns from four flat years of industrial output
Industrial production has spent five straight readings within 1.2 points of its 2017 base. That flat line is not evidence that nothing is being built. It is evidence that the aggregate cannot answer the question capital is asking.
- 视角Industrial Policy
What transfers between places is the method, not the programme
Spending on manufacturing plant rose from 75 billion dollars a year to 244 and then fell to 215, and no file held here says where a dollar of it landed. The structures that decide whether such spending works are published state by state, but nothing here records a single award, decision or outcome.